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TROLL STORMS AND TORT LIABILITY
FOR SPEECH URGING ACTION BY OTHERS:
A FIRST AMENDMENT ANALYSIS AND
AN INITIAL STEP TOWARD A FEDERAL RULE
CLAY CALVERT*
ABSTRACT
This Commentary examines when, consistent with First Amendment
principles of free expression, speakers can be held tortiously responsible
for the actions of others with whom they have no contractual or employeremployee relationship. It argues that recent lawsuits against Daily Stormer
publisher Andrew Anglin for sparking “troll storms” provide a timely
analytical springboard into the issue of vicarious tort liability.
Furthermore, such liability is particularly problematic when a speaker’s
message urging action does not fall into an unprotected category of
expression, such as incitement or true threats, and thus, were it not for tort
law, would be fully protected.
In examining the possibility of vicarious tort liability, this Commentary
reviews the U.S. Supreme Court’s “authorized, directed, or ratified” test
for vicarious liability, which was established more than thirty-five years ago
in the pre-Internet-era case of NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co. The
Commentary concludes by proposing a framework for vicarious liability
when speakers urge action that results in others’ tortious conduct.

*
Professor of Law, Brechner Eminent Scholar in Mass Communication, and Director of the
Marion B. Brechner First Amendment Project at the University of Florida in Gainesville, Fla. B.A.,
1987, Communication, Stanford University; J.D. (Order of the Coif), 1991, McGeorge School of Law,
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Commentary.
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INTRODUCTION
In November 2018, a federal judge in Montana refused to dismiss Tanya
Gersh’s tort claims against Andrew Anglin for intentional infliction of
emotional distress1 and invasion of privacy2 in Gersh v. Anglin.3 Anglin,
“[o]ne of America’s most prominent neo-Nazis,” 4 operates the Daily
Stormer.5 It has been described as “the Internet’s most notorious neo-Nazi
1.
Under the Montana law applicable in Gersh v. Anglin, 353 F. Supp. 3d 958 (D. Mont. 2018),
“[a]n independent cause of action for negligent or intentional infliction of emotional distress arises under
circumstances where 1) serious or severe emotional distress to the plaintiff was 2) the reasonably
foreseeable consequence of 3) the defendant’s negligent or intentional act or omission.” Wages v. First
Nat’l Ins. Co. of Am., 79 P.3d 1095, 1098 (Mont. 2003); see also Czajkowski v. Meyers, 172 P.3d 94,
100–01 (Mont. 2007) (stating that a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress “arises
when a plaintiff suffers serious and severe emotional distress as a reasonably foreseeable consequence
of a defendant’s intentional act or omission”).
Significantly, Montana’s definition of intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED) does not
require proof that the defendant’s conduct was outrageous. See Maloney v. Home & Inv. Ctr., Inc., 994
P.2d 1124, 1134–35 (Mont. 2000) (observing that the element of “outrageousness” was eliminated by
the Supreme Court of Montana in Sacco v. High Country Indep. Press, Inc., 896 P.2d 411 (Mont. 1995)).
This contrasts with the Restatement (Second) of Torts’ definition of IIED, which provides that “[o]ne
who by extreme and outrageous conduct intentionally or recklessly causes severe emotional distress to
another is subject to liability for such emotional distress.” R ESTATEMENT (S ECOND ) OF T ORTS § 46(1)
(AM. LAW INST. 1965) (emphasis added). Indeed, IIED typically “consists of four elements: (1) the
defendant’s conduct must be intentional or reckless, (2) the conduct must be outrageous and intolerable,
(3) the defendant’s conduct must cause the plaintiff emotional distress and (4) the distress must be
severe.” Karen Markin, The Truth Hurts: Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress as a Cause of
Action Against the Media, 5 COMM. L. & POL’Y 469, 476 (2000).
2.
Under the Montana law applicable in Gersh, a common law cause of action for invasion of
privacy by intrusion “is defined as a ‘wrongful intrusion into one’s private activities in such a manner
as to outrage or cause mental suffering, shame, or humiliation to a person of ordinary sensibilities.’”
Rucinsky v. Hentchel, 881 P.2d 616, 618 (Mont. 1994) (quoting Sistok v. Nw. Tel. Sys., Inc., 615 P.2d
176, 182 (Mont. 1980)).
3.
Gersh, 353 F. Supp. 3d at 969–70. The court also refused to dismiss a cause of action based
on a Montana anti-intimidation statute. Id. at 970–71; see M ONT . C ODE A NN . § 27-1-1503(2) (2019)
(“An individual or organization who is attempting to exercise a legally protected right and who is injured,
harassed, or aggrieved by a threat or intimidation has a civil cause of action against the person engaging
in the threatening or intimidating behavior.”).
In July 2019, U.S. Magistrate Judge Jeremiah C. Lynch recommended that default judgment be
granted in favor of Tanya Gersh after Andrew Anglin failed to appear at a properly noticed deposition
in April 2019. Gersh v. Anglin, No. CV 17-50-M-DLC-JCL, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 134688, at *2, *6
(D. Mont. July 15, 2019). Magistrate Lynch also recommended that Gersh be awarded $4,042,438 in
compensatory damages and $10,000,000 in punitive damages. Id. at *6. Furthermore, Lynch
recommended “a permanent injunction ordering Anglin to remove from his website the blog posts
encouraging his readers to contact Gersh, her family and, especially, her son, including all photographs
and images of the family and comment boards associated therewith.” Id. In August 2019, U.S. District
Chief Judge Dana L. Christensen adopted in full Magistrate Lynch’s findings and recommendations,
remarking that default judgment was “an appropriate sanction for Anglin’s absolute refusal to defend.”
Gersh v. Anglin, No. CV 17-50-M-DLC-JCL, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 133795, at *2 (D. Mont. Aug. 8,
2019).
4.
Matt Pearce, White Nationalism Faltered, but Gab Was Its Safe Harbor, L.A. T IMES , Oct.
29, 2018, at A2.
5.
See Trip Gabriel, A Bullhorn of Anti-Immigrant Rhetoric, Long Before Trump Started, N.Y.
T IMES , Jan. 11, 2019, at A10 (describing Anglin as “the founder of the neo-Nazi Daily Stormer”); see
also Michael Kunzelman, Neo-Nazi Who Claims Nigeria as Home Gets Warning from Judge, P HILA .
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website, featuring sections including ‘Jewish Problem’ and ‘Race War.’”6
The Daily Stormer, as this Commentary explains, plays a pivotal role in
Gersh v. Anglin.
Tanya Gersh, a Jewish real estate agent from Whitefish, Montana, 7
contends that Anglin, a “pale prince of extremism,” 8 lived up to that
moniker by sparking a troll storm 9 against her. The trouble began after
Gersh and fellow Whitefish resident Sherry Spencer, the mother of alt-right
leader Richard Spencer, 10 had a falling out over a possible real estate
transaction.11 The spat drew Anglin’s attention after Sherry Spencer, who
owns a commercial property,12 wrote on Medium that “Gersh had tried to
threaten and extort her into agreeing to sell her building . . . and denouncing
her son’s views.”13
Spencer’s accusation prompted Anglin in December 2016 to publish on
the Daily Stormer “Gersh’s phone numbers, email addresses, and social
media profiles, as well as those of her husband, twelve-year-old son, friends,
and colleagues. Anglin asked readers to ‘[t]ell them you are sickened by
T RIB ., Dec. 31, 2017, at 5A (noting that Anglin’s website “takes its name from Der Stürmer, a newspaper
that published Nazi propaganda”).
6.
Matt Pearce, Notorious Neo-Nazi Site Was Built with Father’s Help, L.A. T IMES , Nov. 26,
2018, at A2.
7.
Kimberly Winston, Fighting Neo-Nazis with Faith, Peace and Allies, S TATE J.-R EG .
(Springfield, Ill.), May 13, 2018, at P30.
8.
Stephen Koff, Top Ohio Neo-Nazi Playing Hard to Get – Legal Process Servers Just Can’t
Find Him, P LAIN D EALER (Cleveland, Ohio), Dec. 30, 2017, at A1.
9.
Troll is slang for “a person who purposefully posts offensive comments in order to antagonize
others.” Carissa Byrne Hessick, Towards a Series of Academic Norms for #Lawprof Twitter, 101 M ARQ .
L. R EV . 903, 921 n.63 (2018); see P NINA F ICHMAN & M ADELYN R. S ANFILIPPO , O NLINE T ROLLING
AND I TS P ERPETRATORS : U NDER THE C YBERBRIDGE 6 (2016) (defining “online trolling as a
repetitive, disruptive online deviant behavior by an individual toward other individuals and groups,”
noting the “media’s misappropriation of the term to describe various acts of online deviance and
disobedience,” and pointing out the “[l]ack of clarity and agreement about what constitutes a troll”
(emphasis in original)).
10.
Richard Spencer, the president of the National Policy Institute, is “a prominent white
nationalist” who “is credited with coining the term ‘alternative right,’ or ‘alt-right,’ almost a decade
ago.” Anemona Hartocollis, University of Florida Braces for Appearance by White Nationalist, N.Y.
T IMES , Oct. 18, 2017, at A17. Spencer was “one of the main organizers of the ‘Unite the Right’ rally”
in Charlottesville, Virginia in August 2017 that resulted “in a violent confrontation at the downtown site
of the historic Robert E. Lee statue. The chaotic melee led to the death of Heather Heyer in a carramming attack and of two State Police officers in a helicopter accident, as well as dozens of injuries.”
James Loeffler, The Shadow Over Charlottesville, W ALL S T . J., Aug. 11, 2018, at C4.
11.
Complaint for Invasion of Privacy, Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress, and
Violations of the Anti-Intimidation Act at 5–7, Gersh v. Anglin, 353 F. Supp. 3d 958 (D. Mont. 2018)
(No. 9:17-CV-00050-DLC-JCL) [hereinafter Gersh Complaint], https://www.splcenter.org/sites/defaul
t/files/documents/whitefish_complaint_finalstamped.pdf [https://perma.cc/YV7A-HPWC].
12.
See Phil Drake & Seaborn Larson, Neo-Nazi Invoked Racist ‘Troll Storm,’ Lawsuit Alleges,
USA T ODAY , Apr. 19, 2017, at 8A (reporting that Sherry Spencer owns “a mixed-use commercial
building” in Whitefish, Montana).
13.
Gersh Complaint, supra note 11, at 7.
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their Jew agenda to attack and harm the mother of someone whom they
disagree with.’”14 One of Anglin’s posts, which followed the all-capitalized
heading “TAKE ACTION,” read, “This is very important. Calling these
people up and/or sending them a quick message is very easy. It is very
important that we make them feel the kind of pressure they are making us
feel.”15 Another implored, “Let’s Hit Em Up[.] Are y’all ready for an old
fashioned Troll Storm? Because AYO – it’s that time, fam.”16
According to Gersh’s complaint, these posts and others by Anglin caused
her to receive “hundreds of hateful and threatening anti-Semitic phone calls,
voicemails, text messages, emails, letters, social media comments, and false
online business reviews.”17 Among the messages Gersh received across
different forms of media were:
• “Ratfaced criminals who play with fire tend to get thrown in the
oven.”18
• “We are going to ruin you, you Kike PoS [piece of shit] . . . You
will be driven to the brink of suicide . . . We will be there to take
pleasure in your pain & eventual end.”19
• “Worthless fuckin kike.”20
• “You filthy piece of trash. You are threatening an old lady. You
worthless piece of shit. I hope you die, you worthless cunt. You
stupid ugly bitch.”21
This “tsunami of threats,”22 as Gersh’s attorneys at the Southern Poverty
Law Center labeled them, included ones of death23 and “[m]any messages
referenced the Holocaust.”24 According to the Atlantic, one email bluntly
stated, “[a]ll of you deserve a bullet through your skull.”25 Furthermore,
Gersh’s young son, whom Anglin labeled a “scamming little kike” and a

14.
Gersh v. Anglin, 353 F. Supp. 3d 958, 962 (D. Mont. 2018).
15.
Gersh Complaint, supra note 11, at 20.
16.
Id. (alteration in original).
17.
Id. at 2.
18.
Id. at 4.
19.
Id. (first and second alteration in original).
20.
Id.
21.
Id. at 27.
22.
Id. at 4.
23.
Id. at 3.
24.
Gersh v. Anglin, 353 F. Supp. 3d 958, 963 (D. Mont. 2018).
25.
Luke O’Brien, The Making of an American Nazi, A TLANTIC , Dec. 2017, https://www.theatla
ntic.com/magazine/archive/2017/12/the-making-of-an-american-nazi/544119/ [https://perma.cc/ZQ4M
-YCPM].
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“creepy little faggot” on the Daily Stormer,26 received hateful messages on
his Twitter account.27
While clearly implicating free speech issues, Gersh v. Anglin is about
much more than just hateful and offensive speech, which the United States
Supreme Court has made clear is generally protected 28 by the First
Amendment. 29 Rather, Gersh revolves around what is commonly called
doxing.30 Doxing typically involves “publicly posting private information
as a form of revenge or punishment” 31 and occurs “when someone’s
personal information is shared on the Internet without their consent.” 32
Through the lens of doxing, Gersh raises an important question that forms
the heart of this Commentary—one which is sure to arise often in the digital
era: When, consistent with First Amendment principles of free expression,
should a person who urges action be held vicariously liable33 in tort law for
26.
Gersh Complaint, supra note 11, at 4.
27.
Id. For example, one message read, “ask your mommy why she hates white people so much
and runs an extortion racket.” Id.
28.
As Justice Samuel Alito recently wrote, “[s]peech that demeans on the basis of race, ethnicity,
gender, religion, age, disability, or any other similar ground is hateful; but the proudest boast of our free
speech jurisprudence is that we protect the freedom to express ‘the thought that we hate.’” Matal v. Tam,
137 S. Ct. 1744, 1764 (2017) (quoting United States v. Schwimmer, 279 U.S. 644, 655 (1929) (Holmes,
J., dissenting)); see also Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989) (“If there is a bedrock principle
underlying the First Amendment, it is that the government may not prohibit the expression of an idea
simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable.”).
29.
The First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides, in pertinent part, that “Congress
shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press.” U.S. CONST. amend. I. The
Free Speech and Free Press Clauses were incorporated nearly ninety-five years ago through the
Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause as fundamental liberties that cannot be impaired by state
and local government entities and officials. See Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925).
30.
See Erwin Chemerinsky, Tobriner Memorial Lecture: Free Speech on Campus, 69
H ASTINGS L.J. 1339, 1353 (2018) (noting that the harm caused by doxing is somewhat akin to injury
that the tort of public disclosure of private facts is designed to address, such as when “very private
information is put on the internet about somebody, such as the fact that a person is undocumented or
transgender”).
31.
Brittany Scott, Note, Waiving Goodbye to First Amendment Protections: First Amendment
Waiver by Contract, 46 H ASTINGS C ONST . L.Q. 451, 476 (2019).
32.
Lisa Bei Li, Data Privacy in the Cyber Age: Recommendations for Regulating Doxing and
Swatting, 70 F ED . C OMM . L.J. 317, 318 (2018).
33.
Regarding vicarious liability in tort law, Professor Joseph H. King, Jr. explains that:
[W]hen a victim suffers a tortious injury and the tortfeasor is party to a legally sufficient
relationship with another, the victim may have a tort claim against the tortfeasor for his direct
liability and against the other for vicarious liability (and occasionally for direct liability as well).
Vicarious liability in general has three core requirements: First, there must be a legally
sufficient relationship—one that the law recognizes will support the imposition of vicarious
liability—between the person who caused the plaintiff’s injury (A) and the vicariously liable
defendant (B). Second, A, whose conduct caused the plaintiff’s injury, must have been acting
tortiously. And finally, the tortious conduct by A, the tortfeasor, must have occurred within the
scope of the legally sufficient relationship with B, the person against whom vicarious liability
is asserted.
Joseph H. King, Jr., Limiting the Vicarious Liability of Franchisors for the Torts of Their Franchisees,
62 W ASH . & L EE L. R EV . 417, 427–28 (2005). Simply put, in vicarious liability situations, “courts treat
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the resulting conduct of others who are not acting as his servants in an
agency relationship?34
This question is especially contentious in cases like Gersh where the
plaintiff does not assert that the defendant’s speech falls into an unprotected
category of expression,35 such as incitement to violence.36 In other words, if
Andrew Anglin’s speech is not an incitement to unlawful conduct under the
test articulated by the Supreme Court a half-century ago in Brandenburg v.
Ohio,37 how can he nonetheless be held responsible for inciting the troll
storm against Tanya Gersh? Ultimately, this issue was never fully litigated
in Gersh because Anglin stopped defending himself and default judgment
was entered against him in August 2019.38

employer and employee as the ‘same tortfeasor’ for purposes of liability.” J.M. Balkin, Essay, Free
Speech and Hostile Environments, 99 C OLUM . L. R EV . 2295, 2301 (1999).
34.
See R ESTATEMENT (S ECOND ) OF A GENCY § 220 (1) (AM. LAW INST. 1958) (“A servant is
a person employed to perform services in the affairs of another and who with respect to the physical
conduct in the performance of the services is subject to the other’s control or right to control.”); Randy
S. Parlee, Vicarious Liability for Punitive Damages: Suggested Changes in the Law Through Policy
Analysis, 68 M ARQ . L. R EV . 27, 30 (1984) (“It is elementary that a master or principal is liable for
compensatory damages caused by the wrongful act of a servant or agent acting within the scope of the
agency.”); Nancy J. Whitmore, Vicarious Liability and the Private University Student Press, 11 C OMM .
L. & P OL ’ Y 255, 259 (2006) (“It is often said an agency relationship consists of three elements: consent
by the principal and agent, control by the principal, and action by the agent on the principal’s behalf.”).
35.
The U.S. Supreme Court has identified several categories of expression that receive no First
Amendment protection. See United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 717 (2012) (identifying the
categories of unprotected expression as incitement to violence, obscenity, defamation, speech integral
to criminal conduct, fighting words, child pornography, fraud, true threats, and “speech presenting some
grave and imminent threat the government has the power to prevent”); Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal.,
535 U.S. 234, 245–46 (2002) (“The freedom of speech has its limits; it does not embrace certain
categories of speech, including defamation, incitement, obscenity, and pornography produced with real
children.”).
36.
See Gersh v. Anglin, 353 F. Supp. 3d 958, 963 (D. Mont. 2018) (finding that “the speech
does not fall into a de facto unprotected category. And in fact Gersh does not contend that Anglin’s
speech falls within one of the few ‘historic and traditional categories of expression long familiar to the
bar’ for which content-based restrictions on speech are clearly permitted” (quoting Alvarez, 567 U.S. at
717)).
37.
395 U.S. 444 (1969) (per curiam). In Brandenburg, the Court held:
[T]he constitutional guarantees of free speech and free press do not permit a State to forbid or
proscribe advocacy of the use of force or of law violation except where such advocacy is
directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such
action.
Id. at 447. Under this test for incitement to violence or unlawful conduct, speech is unprotected if three
elements exist, including: “(1) intent (embodied in the requirement that such speech . . . be ‘directed to
inciting or producing’ lawless action); (2) imminence (embodied in the phrase ‘imminent lawless
action’); and (3) likelihood (embodied in the phrase ‘and is likely to incite or produce such action’).”
Rodney A. Smolla, Should the Brandenburg v. Ohio Incitement Test Apply in Media Violence Tort
Cases?, 27 N. K Y . L. R EV . 1, 10 (2000) (quoting Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 446–47).
38.
Gersh v. Anglin, No. 17-50-M-DLC-JCL, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 133795 (D. Mont. Aug. 8,
2019).
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Notably, Gersh was not the only troll-storm lawsuit against Anglin.
Another case involved Taylor Dumpson.39 In 2017, Dumpson became the
first African-American president of the student government at American
University. 40 On the day she assumed this role, “bananas with hateful
messages were found hanging from nooses” 41 on campus. This incident
sparked a review by the Federal Bureau of Investigation.42
The racism Dumpson confronted, however, was not confined to campus;
it quickly spread online.
Dumpson sued Anglin for, among other causes of action, intentional
infliction of emotional distress43 after he posted her “picture and personal
information online and exhorted his followers to harass and bully her, a
tactic he has also employed against Jewish and Muslim targets.”44 As with
Gersh, Dumpson alleged that “a troll storm ensued.”45 She contended that
she “feared for her safety amid the relentless harassment, and was
eventually diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder.”46
As was the situation in Gersh, Andrew Anglin failed to defend against
Taylor Dumpson’s lawsuit and default judgment was entered against him in
August 2019.47 In brief, the crucial issue at the heart of this Commentary
regarding vicarious tort liability for speech-sparked troll storms was never
fully litigated or resolved in either Gersh or Dumpson.
With this background in mind, Part I of this Commentary examines Chief
U.S. District Judge Dana Christensen’s analysis of whether Andrew Anglin
should be held tortiously responsible for the speech of others who harassed

39.
Complaint, Dumpson v. Ade, No. 1:18-CV-01011 (D.D.C. Apr. 30, 2018) [hereinafter
Dumpson Complaint], https://www.courthousenews.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/DUMPSON-vAde.pdf [https://perma.cc/E4NF-W8XL].
40.
Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Nooses on the Fourth of July, N.Y. T IMES , July 6, 2017, at A2; see
Press Release, Lawyers’ Comm. for Civil Rights Under Law, Landmark Settlement Between Hate
Incident Perpetrator and Survivor Announced in Dumpson v. Ade (Dec. 18, 2018), https://lawyerscommi
ttee.org/landmark-settlement-between-hate-incident-perpetrator-and-survivor-announced-in-dumpsonv-ade/ [https://perma.cc/UE56-CGAC] (noting that in March 2017, Dumpson “was elected as American
University’s first female African American student body president”).
41.
Sheryl Gay Stolberg & Caitlin Dickerson, Nooses, Potent Symbols of Hate, Crop Up in Rash
of Cases, N.Y. T IMES , July 6, 2017, at A11.
42.
Jacey Fortin, F.B.I. Helping American University Investigate Bananas Found Hanging from
Nooses, N.Y. T IMES (May 3, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/03/us/bananas-hang-from-black
-nooses-and-a-campus-erupts-in-protest.html [https://perma.cc/QX2D-HK5Q].
43.
See Dumpson Complaint, supra note 39, at 58–60 (setting forth the cause of action for
intentional infliction of emotional distress).
44.
Karen Zraick, Student Settles with Her Racist Online Harasser, N.Y. T IMES , Dec. 23, 2018,
at A27.
45.
Dumpson Complaint, supra note 39, at 2.
46.
Zraick, supra note 44, at A27.
47.
Dumpson v. Ade, No. 18-1011, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 134011, at *1–2 (D.D.C. Aug. 9,
2019).
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Tanya Gersh.48 In the process, it also dissects Anglin’s arguments against
imposing vicarious liability and explores the vicarious liability standard
developed in NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co.49 more than thirty-five
years ago. Part II then addresses, within a much broader First Amendment
framework, the question of vicarious liability in other speech-based cases,
as well as a possible dichotomy between ideas and instructions.50 Finally,
Part III concludes by suggesting criteria for courts to use when evaluating
vicarious liability issues that arise at the intersection of First Amendment
jurisprudence and tort law.51
I. GERSH, THE FIRST AMENDMENT & VICARIOUS LIABILITY: EXAMINING
JUDGE CHRISTENSEN’S REASONING
To better understand whether Andrew Anglin should, consistent with
First Amendment principles of free expression, be held vicariously liable in
tort law for the speech of Daily Stormer readers who targeted Tanya Gersh,
it helps to unpack the issue into two sub-questions:
1. Does the First Amendment give absolute protection to Andrew Anglin
from tort liability if his speech does not fall into an unprotected category of
expression, such as incitement52 or true threats?53
2. If the First Amendment does not shield Anglin from tort liability, then
what is necessary to hold him vicariously liable for the tortious speech of
third parties?
Section A addresses the first sub-question. Section B then addresses the
second.

48.
See infra notes 52–123 and accompanying text.
49.
458 U.S. 886 (1982).
50.
See infra notes 124–179 and accompanying text.
51.
See infra notes 180–219 and accompanying text.
52.
See supra note 37 and accompanying text (setting forth the U.S. Supreme Court’s current test
for incitement to unlawful conduct).
53.
See Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 359 (2003) (observing that “the First Amendment . . .
permits a State to ban a ‘true threat,’” and providing that such threats “encompass those statements where
the speaker means to communicate a serious expression of an intent to commit an act of unlawful
violence to a particular individual or group of individuals” (quoting Watts v. United States, 394 U.S.
705, 708 (1969))); see generally Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky & Linda Riedemann Norbut, #I🔫U:
Considering the Context of Online Threats, 106 C ALIF . L. R EV . 1885, 1889–90 (2018) (noting that
although the Supreme Court has held that true threats are not protected by the First Amendment, it has
not answered “fundamental questions regarding the ‘true threats exception’ to First Amendment
protection, including whether courts should view threats from the vantage of the speaker, a reasonable
recipient, a reasonable disinterested reader, or all of the above; and what mens rea the First Amendment
requires in threats cases” (footnote omitted)).
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A. Tort Liability for Otherwise Protected Speech
Turning to the first sub-question—whether the First Amendment shelters
Anglin from all tort liability if his speech does not fall within an unprotected
category of expression—Professor David Anderson calls it sometimes
“difficult to square the demands of the First Amendment with the methods
of tort law.” 54 This is particularly true when “the claim arises from the
content of speech that would be fully protected by the First Amendment if
it were not tortious.”55
Indeed, that was precisely the situation in Gersh; Anglin contended he
should not be held tortiously liable because his speech did not fit into a
category of speech that is unprotected by the First Amendment.56 According
to attorney Marc Randazza in his brief supporting Anglin’s motion to
dismiss, “[e]very word uttered by Mr. Anglin in this public dispute is
protected by the First Amendment, no matter how many people find those
views intolerable.” 57 Notably, Judge Christensen, in fact, agreed that
Anglin’s “speech does not fall into a de facto unprotected category.” 58
Concluding that speech may be protected by the First Amendment,
however, does not eliminate the possibility that its speaker can be held liable
in tort law.
Another federal district court judge recently explained this principle in
Stricklin v. Stefani.59 There, Judge Robert Conrad, Jr. refused in December
2018 to dismiss a negligence claim against No Doubt singer Gwen Stefani.60
During a concert, the singer had urged audience members to move closer to
the stage, thereby precipitating a fan’s injuries caused by the throngs coming
forward.61 In refusing to dismiss the case, Conrad wrote,

54.
David A. Anderson, First Amendment Limitations on Tort Law, 69 B ROOK . L. R EV . 755,
757 (2004).
55.
Id. at 758.
56.
Gersh v. Anglin, 353 F. Supp. 3d 958, 963 (D. Mont. 2018).
57.
Defendant Andrew Anglin’s Brief in Support of Motion to Dismiss at 3, Gersh v. Anglin,
353 F. Supp. 3d 958 (D. Mont. 2018) (No. 9:17-CV-00050-DLC-JCL), https://www.courtlistener.com/r
ecap/gov.uscourts.mtd.54518/gov.uscourts.mtd.54518.32.0.pdf [https://perma.cc/NP96-HJRK].
58.
Gersh, 353 F. Supp. 3d at 963.
59.
358 F. Supp. 3d 516 (W.D.N.C. 2018).
60.
See id. at 536 (“Plaintiff’s negligence claim against Stefani may proceed to trial.”).
61.
Stefani told the crowd at a July 2016 concert in Charlotte, North Carolina:
I’m just going to tell you something. I’m just going to talk to the security guards for one second.
If anyone wants to come down a little closer so I can see you a little better, just come on down,
I don’t think anyone’s going to care, like just fill it in and like and you know, who cares about
your lawn chairs, you can get new ones.
Id. at 522–23. Plaintiff Lisa Keri Striklin claimed “she was terrified as she saw the crowd moving
forward behind her.” Id. at 523. She asserted that she was “trampled and forcibly pushed into a wall”
and, in turn, suffered “a lateral tibial plateau fracture to her left leg.” Id.
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Stefani asserts that because her statements do not fall into one of the
exceptions to the First Amendment, she cannot be held liable in tort.
The Court agrees that Stefani’s statements do not fall squarely within
one of the previously recognized categorical exemptions to First
Amendment protection. However, the Court disagrees that the First
Amendment immunizes all other speech falling outside these
categories, including negligent speech which results in bodily injury
to others.62
For Judge Conrad in Stricklin, the relevant inquiry for deciding if Stefani
could be held tortiously liable for her words was “to examine [her]
statements and surrounding circumstances and weigh how those statements
either further or hinder the principles and purposes undergirding the First
Amendment. In all First Amendment cases, this is the central inquiry.”63
Judge Christensen in Gersh took a similar approach. He reasoned that
whether Andrew Anglin could be held responsible in tort law for his speech
depended largely on whether it was about a matter of private interest or
public concern, with speech falling into the former category—private
speech—not being immune from liability.64
This consideration comports with the U.S. Supreme Court’s
determination in Snyder v. Phelps 65 that the speech of members of the
Westboro Baptist Church was sheltered from tort liability because it dealt
with matters of public concern.66 As Chief Justice John Roberts wrote for
the Snyder majority, “[w]hether the First Amendment prohibits holding
Westboro liable for its speech in this case turns largely on whether that
speech is of public or private concern, as determined by all the
circumstances of the case.”67
In Gersh, Judge Christensen concluded the plaintiff “made a plausible
claim that Anglin’s speech involved a matter of strictly private concern.”68
The judge reasoned here that:
Anglin launched a campaign of unrelated personal attacks on a
Whitefish realtor, her husband, and their son because of a perceived
conflict between Gersh and the mother of Anglin’s friend, another
62.
Id. at 526.
63.
Id. at 527.
64.
Gersh v. Anglin, 353 F. Supp. 3d 958, 964–67 (D. Mont. 2018).
65.
562 U.S. 443 (2011).
66.
Id. at 458–59. The majority concluded that the speech of the members of the Westboro
Baptist Church addressed “matters of public import,” including “the political and moral conduct of the
United States and its citizens, the fate of our Nation, homosexuality in the military, and scandals
involving the Catholic clergy.” Id. at 454.
67.
Id. at 451.
68.
Gersh, 353 F. Supp. 3d at 965.
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white supremacist. Although Anglin drew heavily on his readers’
hatred and fear of ethnic Jews, rousing their political sympathies,
there is more than a colorable claim that he did so strictly to further
his campaign to harass Gersh.69
Anglin had averred that “Gersh injected herself into a matter of public
concern by discussing the sale of Sherry Spencer’s building with
Spencer.” 70 The sale was arguably a matter of public concern because
Sherry Spencer faced “boycotts related to her son’s notoriety.” 71
Additionally, Anglin contended his words were about a public issue because
“his speech about Gersh was both ‘in support of Richard Spencer’s speech
in support of President Trump’ and ‘related to the growth of white
nationalism in Whitefish, and the community’s response thereto.’”72
These public-concern arguments failed to convince Judge Christensen,
at least at the motion-to-dismiss phase under the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.73 He found that:
[C]onstruing the allegations in the Complaint as true, Anglin
exploited the prejudices widely held among his readers to specifically
target one individual. Moreover, the Court concludes that, at this
stage of the litigation, it cannot agree with Anglin that his speech was
indisputably tethered to Gersh’s conduct in engaging in a matter of
public controversy.74
In summary, Judge Christensen concluded that although Andrew
Anglin’s speech did not fit within a category of expression unprotected by
the First Amendment, it nonetheless was subject to tort liability because it
did not clearly address a matter of public concern. More broadly, in both
Gersh and Stricklin, federal district courts in 2018 concluded that the First
Amendment did not shield from tort liability speakers who urged others to
take action despite their words not rising to the level of an unprotected
incitement.
This result in Gersh led Judge Christensen to address the second subquestion noted at the start of this part of the Commentary: If the First
Amendment does not shield Anglin from tort liability, then what—

69.
Id. at 966.
70.
Id.
71.
Id. at 963.
72.
Id. at 966.
73.
See F ED . R. C IV . P. 12(b)(6) (providing a defense for “failure to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted”).
74.
Gersh, 353 F. Supp. 3d at 967.
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consistent with First Amendment principles—is necessary to hold him
vicariously liable for the tortious speech acts of third parties?
B. Vicarious Liability for the Tortious Speech of Others
On the issue of vicarious liability, Judge Christensen again focused on
the fact that “Anglin was not speaking on a matter of public
concern.”75 Christensen thus determined Anglin’s speech was not “within
the core of the First Amendment.” 76 This meant, in brief, that vicarious
liability was at least possible in Gersh. To determine whether, in fact, it
should be imposed on Anglin, the judge turned to the U.S. Supreme Court’s
1982 ruling in NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co. 77 Christensen
concluded, as explained below, that Claiborne Hardware “advance[d]
Gersh’s theory”78 regarding vicarious liability.
Claiborne Hardware centered on the boycott of white merchants by
black citizens in Claiborne County, Mississippi, in the 1960s.79 In response
to the boycott, Claiborne Hardware Co. and several other boycotted
businesses sued “to recover losses caused by the boycott and to enjoin future
boycott activity.”80 A key First Amendment issue was whether those who
spoke in favor of the boycott should be held liable to the targeted white
merchants because their speech “was used to further the aims of the
boycott.”81 It is worth noting that some of this speech allegedly threatened
various forms of retaliation against black citizens who failed to join the
boycott.82
The Supreme Court acknowledged that the speech at issue involved the
exercise of protected First Amendment rights. 83 Yet, it also noted that a
“[g]overnmental regulation that has an incidental effect on First
Amendment freedoms may be justified in certain narrowly defined
instances.”84 In brief, Claiborne Hardware pitted the government’s “broad
power to regulate economic activity”85—the Court noted on this point that
75.
Id. at 968.
76.
Id.
77.
458 U.S. 886 (1982).
78.
Gersh, 353 F. Supp. 3d at 968.
79.
Claiborne Hardware, 458 U.S. at 889–90.
80.
Id. at 889.
81.
Id. at 909.
82.
See id. at 909–10 (noting that “names of boycott violators were read aloud at meetings at the
First Baptist Church and published in a local black newspaper. Petitioners admittedly sought to persuade
others to join the boycott through social pressure and the ‘threat’ of social ostracism”).
83.
Id. at 911–12.
84.
Id. at 912; see generally Michael C. Dorf, Incidental Burdens on Fundamental Rights, 109
H ARV . L. R EV . 1175 (1996) (providing a comprehensive review of the meaning and importance of
incidental burdens in federal constitutional law).
85.
Claiborne Hardware, 458 U.S. at 913.
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boycotts “may have a disruptive effect on local economic conditions”86—
against the First Amendment freedoms of speech, peaceable assembly, and
petition.87
The vicarious liability issue thus pivoted on whether the defendants—
those who called for the boycott—should be held responsible for the
conduct of the actual boycotters whose actions, in failing to patronize the
plaintiffs’ businesses, caused those businesses economic harm. Delivering
the Court’s opinion, Justice John Paul Stevens stressed that “the presence
of activity protected by the First Amendment imposes restraints on the
grounds that may give rise to damages liability and on the persons who may
be held accountable for those damages.” 88 In other words, because the
defendants engaged in protected speech—assembly and petition activities
while calling for the boycott—their liability for damages wrought by the
boycotters needed to be restrained due to the First Amendment.
Examining the vicarious liability issue, the Court focused on the speech
of defendant Charles Evers. 89 Evers was field secretary of the National
Association for the Advancement of Colored People in Mississippi.90 He
drew special attention because he allegedly “threatened violence on a
number of occasions against boycott breakers.” 91 In one instance, he
purportedly proclaimed: “If we catch any of you going in any of them racist
stores, we’re gonna break your damn neck.”92
The Court rejected imposing liability on Evers. 93 Justice Stevens
explained that “[t]o the extent that Evers caused respondents to suffer
business losses through his organization of the boycott, his emotional and
persuasive appeals for unity in the joint effort, or his ‘threats’ of vilification
or social ostracism, Evers’ conduct is constitutionally protected and beyond
the reach of a damages award.”94 The Court zeroed in on the fact that Evers’
pro-boycott speeches “predominantly contained highly charged political
rhetoric lying at the core of the First Amendment.”95

86.
Id. at 912.
87.
See id. (“Through speech, assembly, and petition—rather than through riot or revolution—
petitioners sought to change a social order that had consistently treated them as second-class citizens.”).
88.
Id. at 916–17.
89.
See id. at 902, 926–30 (mentioning and examining Evers’s speech and the possibility that he
be held vicariously liable for it).
90.
Id. at 890.
91.
Id. at 898 (quoting Supplemental Respondent’s Brief at 13).
92.
Id. at 902.
93.
Id. at 926.
94.
Id.
95.
Id. at 926–27.
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Justice Stevens suggested, however, that Evers might nonetheless be
held “liable for the unlawful conduct of others” 96 if either: 1) “he
authorized, directed, or ratified specific tortious activity,” 97 or 2) if his
speech constituted an unlawful incitement to violence under Brandenburg98
and such “unlawful conduct . . . in fact followed within a reasonable
period.” 99 As to the latter possibility, the Court concluded that Evers’s
speech did not amount to unprotected incitement per Brandenburg. 100 It
emphasized that “mere advocacy of the use of force or violence does not
remove speech from the protection of the First Amendment.”101
As to the former theory for vicarious liability, the Court also rejected
culpability for Evers.102 It reasoned:
If there were other evidence of his authorization of wrongful conduct,
the references to discipline in the speeches could be used to
corroborate that evidence. But any such theory fails for the simple
reason that there is no evidence—apart from the speeches
themselves—that Evers authorized, ratified, or directly threatened
acts of violence.103
Put differently, the Court searched for outside or extrinsic evidence—
evidence beyond the words in Evers’s speeches—that he authorized,
directed, or ratified acts of violence against those who failed to boycott
white merchants. It found such evidence lacking, thereby precluding the
possibility that Evers was liable for others’ allegedly unlawful acts.
The Court similarly examined whether the NAACP, which helped to
organize the boycott, could be found liable for the unlawful conduct of
others, including NAACP members who were not acting in an agency
capacity.104 Here, the Court determined that “[t]o impose liability without a
finding that the NAACP authorized—either actually or apparently—or
ratified unlawful conduct would impermissibly burden the rights of political
association that are protected by the First Amendment.” 105 In short, the

96.
Id. at 927.
97.
Id. (emphasis added).
98.
See supra note 37 and accompanying text (addressing the Brandenburg incitement test).
99.
Claiborne Hardware, 458 U.S. at 927.
100. Id. at 928. The Court explained that although Evers used “emotionally charged rhetoric” and
“strong language,” “[a]n advocate must be free to stimulate his audience with spontaneous and emotional
appeals for unity and action in a common cause. When such appeals do not incite lawless action, they
must be regarded as protected speech.” Id.
101. Id. at 927.
102. Id. at 929.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 930–32.
105. Id. at 931 (emphasis added).
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Court rejected the theory of “guilt by association”106 and, instead, required
evidence of authorization or ratification for the NAACP to be held liable.
Such evidence against it was, just as it was for Charles Evers, absent.107
In Gersh, Judge Christensen used Claiborne Hardware against Andrew
Anglin in two ways. First, the judge emphasized that while the speech in
Claiborne Hardware largely dealt with a matter of public concern—racial
discrimination—and thus merited heightened First Amendment protection,
Anglin’s speech lacked such legitimacy.108 Christensen explained that:
Anglin was not speaking on a matter of public concern. The First
Amendment is considerably more concerned with a concerted action
to address racial discrimination than it is with the ethnic background
and contact information of a realtor who was arguably involved in a
real estate dispute with the mother of Richard Spencer.109
In other words, Claiborne Hardware and Gersh are factually distinct,
with the speech in the former case more deserving of First Amendment
protection against vicarious liability. Additionally, Christensen pointed out
that while the unlawful conduct of neck breaking allegedly advocated in
Claiborne Hardware did not occur, the called-for conduct actually
transpired in Gersh.110
Perhaps more significant than drawing such factual distinctions,
Christensen applied Claiborne Hardware’s test that speakers may be liable
for the tortious activity of others if they “authorized, directed, or ratified”111
it. Specifically, Christensen called the Claiborne Hardware standard “a
mirror” 112 of “Montana’s substantial assistance test.” 113 That test allows
recovery of damages “from a defendant for the tortious conduct of another
when the defendant ‘knows that the other’s conduct constitutes a breach of
duty and gives substantial assistance or encouragement to the other so to
conduct himself.’” 114 Bridging the two tests, Christensen wrote that
“liability may follow when an individual ‘authorized’ or ‘directed’ ‘specific

106. Id. at 932.
107. See id. (“The chancellor’s findings are not adequate to support the judgment against the
NAACP.”).
108. See Gersh v. Anglin, 353 F. Supp. 3d 958, 968 (D. Mont. 2018).
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Claiborne Hardware, 458 U.S. at 927.
112. Gersh, 353 F. Supp. 3d at 969.
113. Id.
114. Id. (quoting Sloan v. Fauque, 784 P.2d 895, 896 (Mont. 1989)).
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tortious activity’—the ‘breach of duty’ required to satisfy the substantial
assistance test under Montana law.”115
Applying this standard, the judge held that, at least at the motion-todismiss stage, Tanya Gersh could proceed with her claim that Anglin was
liable for the speech of his readers. 116 Critical to this outcome was his
determination that:
Anglin expressly summoned a troll storm, publishing personal and
professional contact information for the Gersh family, and offering
samples of the types of anti-Semitic and misogynistic messages his
readers should leave. He oversaw a discussion board on his website,
in which he interacted with readers who posted comments about their
trolling tactics.117
According to Christensen, the objective indicators that Anglin allegedly
had, to use Claiborne Hardware’s phrasing, “authorized, directed, or
ratified specific tortious activity”118 of his readers were that he:
• provided readers with the addresses and numbers necessary to make
direct, personal contact with Tanya Gersh;
• drafted and made available to readers examples of the messages
they should send to Gersh; and
• interacted online with readers who trolled Gersh.119
Therefore, the conduct of “at least some of Anglin’s followers” 120 in
bombarding Tanya Gersh with unwanted messages was imputable to Anglin
and, in turn, supported causes of action against him for invasion of privacy
and intentional infliction of emotional distress.121 As noted earlier, neither
the vicarious liability nor the tort issues were fully litigated because Anglin
stopped defending against the lawsuit and default judgment was entered
against him.122
The next part explores the subject of vicarious liablity in greater detail
from a macro-level perspective, stretching beyond the factual confines of
Gersh v. Anglin. Specifically, it examines the difference between ideas and
115. Id. (citations omitted) (first quoting Claiborne Hardware, 458 U.S. at 927; then quoting
Sloan, 784 P.2d at 896).
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Claiborne Hardware, 458 U.S. at 927.
119. See Gersh, 353 F. Supp. 3d at 969.
120. Id. at 970.
121. Id. at 969–71. The merits of the underlying tort claims are beyond the scope of this
Commentary, which concentrates on the test for vicarious liability for defendant-speakers in non-agency
situations in light of First Amendment principles.
122. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
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instructions, as well as a values-based approach for triggering heightened
First Amendment protection,123 as possible analytical keys for deciding if
vicarious liability should be imposed on speakers who urge others to take
actions that tortiously harm plaintiffs.
II. A CLOSER EXAMINATION OF VICARIOUS LIABILITY:
FIRST AMENDMENT PRINCIPLES AND OTHER CASES
A starting point for critiquing Judge Christensen’s analysis of vicarious
liability in Gersh is to reflect back on Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes’s
dissent nearly ninety-five years ago in Gitlow v. New York.124 In considering
whether Benjamin Gitlow had committed the offense of criminal anarchy
for disseminating a document called “The Left Wing Manifesto,” Holmes
contended that:
Every idea is an incitement. It offers itself for belief and if believed
it is acted on unless some other belief outweighs it or some failure of
energy stifles the movement at its birth. The only difference between
the expression of an opinion and an incitement in the narrower sense
is the speaker’s enthusiasm for the result. Eloquence may set fire to
reason.125
This language, as Justice Thurgood Marshall observed in 1970, is “often
quoted but at least as often disregarded.” 126 It arguably suggests, by its
“unqualified language,”127 that any statement—more precisely, any idea—
carries the potential to spark some form of action by someone somewhere128
and that, in turn, “the very proposition that incitement differ[s] from other
kinds of speech [i]s illusory.”129

123. See infra notes 137–179.
124. 268 U.S. 652 (1925).
125. Id. at 673 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
126. Norton v. Discipline Comm. of E. Tenn. State Univ., 399 U.S. 906, 908 (1970) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
127. G. Edward White, Justice Holmes and the Modernization of Free Speech Jurisprudence: The
Human Dimension, 80 C ALIF . L. R EV . 391, 454 (1992). The notion of “unqualified,” as the author of
this Commentary understands it, refers to the view that every idea—not just some or a few—is an
incitement. Id.
128. In addressing the meaning of this quotation, Professor David R. Dow observes that “[t]here
is nothing worth saying that might not cause some listener to take action, action that may well be
unlawful. A listener who hears a Byron poem may become a radical environmentalist, inspired to
assassinate political leaders whom the listener perceives as hostile to the environment . . . .” David R.
Dow, The Moral Failure of the Clear and Present Danger Test, 6 W M . & M ARY B ILL R TS . J. 733,
742–43 (1998).
129. John M. Kang, Prove Yourselves: Oliver Wendell Holmes and the Obsessions of Manliness,
118 W. V A . L. R EV . 1067, 1072–73 (2016).
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Today, however, a distinction is drawn. Only an idea that “is directed to
inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or
produce such action”130 constitutes an incitement not protected by the First
Amendment. Furthermore, as noted earlier, speech that supposedly triggers
the tortious actions of others may, in fact, not rise to the level of unprotected
incitement under Brandenburg, as was the situation in Gersh.131
The difficulty with imposing vicarious liability for speech urging action
in non-employer-employee settings is that “we can never be sure what
actually is the trigger”132 of someone else’s conduct. Put differently, and to
use the Supreme Court’s phrase in Brown v. Entertainment Merchants
Ass’n,133 it is extremely difficult to prove “a direct causal link”134 between
the defendant-speaker’s words and the subsequent tortious conduct of others
who saw or heard them. That is a key problem because, as Professor Joseph
Russomanno writes, “[a]t the heart of any concern about speech is its
possible effect.” 135 Deploying a test for vicarious liability, such as
Claiborne Hardware’s “authorized, directed, or ratified”136 standard that
was embraced in Gersh, therefore serves as a rough proxy for when it is
legally sufficient to hold that a defendant’s speech caused—and thus the
defendant should be held responsible for—the tortious speech or conduct of
others with whom he or she has no agency relationship.
Although Justice Holmes’s assertion that every idea is an incitement fails
to provide a clear analytical guide for vicarious tort liability, it is
nonetheless useful in another way. Specifically, it centers on ideas—the
notion that every idea is an incitement. Ideas, however, might be contrasted
with instructions. In other words, perhaps there is a meaningful difference
between ideas—the idea of attacking Tanya Gersh through hateful, antiSemetic messages—and instructions—providing direct contact information
and sample scripts for how one can and should communicate with Tanya
Gersh—that are integral for tortious conduct.
Although this is not a clean dichotomy, courts have imposed liability on
130. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (per curiam).
131. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
132. Dow, supra note 128, at 743.
133. 564 U.S. 786 (2011).
134. Id. at 799. The direct-causal-link standard was applied again by the Court in United States v.
Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709 (2012). The Court in Alvarez wrote that “[t]here must be a direct causal link
between the restriction imposed and the injury to be prevented.” Id. at 725; see generally Clay Calvert
& Matthew D. Bunker, An “Actual Problem” in First Amendment Jurisprudence? Examining the
Immediate Impact of Brown’s Proof-of-Causation Doctrine on Free Speech and Its Compatibility with
the Marketplace Theory, 35 H ASTINGS C OMM . & E NT . L.J. 391 (2013) (providing an analysis of the
direct-causal-link standard and some of the problems with its implementation).
135. Joseph Russomanno, Cause and Effect: The Free Speech Transformation as Scientific
Revolution, 20 C OMM . L. & P OL ’ Y 213, 215 (2015).
136. NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 927 (1982).
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speakers for the tortious actions of others in instruction scenarios. For
example, the Supreme Court of California in Weirum v. RKO General,
Inc.137 in 1975 held that the First Amendment did not shield a Los Angeles
radio station from tort liability after a teenage listener “negligently forced a
car off the highway, killing its sole occupant.”138 At the time of the accident,
the listener was trying to win a cash-prize radio contest that required
locating a disc jockey who was driving around and providing tips on his
whereabouts.139 For instance, at one point the disc jockey said:
The Real Don Steele is in the Valley near the intersection of Topanga
and Roscoe Boulevard, right by the Loew’s Holiday Theater—you
know where that is at, and he’s standing there with a little money he
would like to give away to the first person to arrive and tell him what
type car I helped Robert W. Morgan give away yesterday morning at
KHJ.140
The Supreme Court of California had little problem finding the radio
station owed a duty of care to the deceased individual because it was
reasonably foreseeable an accident might be caused by those listening to the
disc jockey. 141 Much as Andrew Anglin repeatedly urged his readers to
contact Tanya Gersh, 142 the radio station engaged in “repeated
importuning” 143 to locate the disc jockey, thereby amounting to “no
commonplace invitation.”144 And much like Andrew Anglin’s followers on
the Daily Stormer might have been particularly susceptible to following his
instructions if they shared Anglin’s apparent belief system about Jews, the
Supreme Court of California in Weirum paid special attention to the fact that
the “extensive teenage audience”145 of the radio station was especially likely
to be influenced by the disc jockey.146

137. 539 P.2d 36 (Cal. 1975).
138. Id. at 37, 40.
139. Id. at 38–39.
140. Id. at 38.
141. See id. at 40.
142. See supra notes 14–16 and accompanying text.
143. Weirum, 539 P.2d at 41.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 37.
146. The Court noted, for instance, that the “tragic events unfolded in the middle of a Los Angeles
summer, a time when young people were free from the constraints of school and responsive to relief
from vacation tedium.” Id. at 40. It added that “[m]oney and a small measure of momentary notoriety
awaited the swiftest response. It was foreseeable that defendant’s youthful listeners, finding the prize
had eluded them at one location, would race to arrive first at the next site and in their haste would
disregard the demands of highway safety.” Id.
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In rejecting the station’s First Amendment argument, the Supreme Court
of California called it “clearly without merit.”147 According to the court,
“[t]he issue here is civil accountability for the foreseeable results of a
broadcast which created an undue risk of harm to decedent. The First
Amendment does not sanction the infliction of physical injury merely
because achieved by word, rather than act.”148 In brief, the radio station was
held vicariously liable for the negligent actions of a third-party listener with
whom it lacked an agency or employer-employee relationship.149
If actively and repeatedly encouraging and urging a specific action,
accompanied by instructions about where to find a car, can result in such
vicarious tort liability for the speaker in Weirum,150 then perhaps this paves
a path for holding Andrew Anglin accountable for repeatedly urging the
allegedly tortious actions committed by his readers and for providing the
email and social media addresses for doing so. Although Judge Christensen
in Gersh did not reference or cite Weirum, its logic should not be
overlooked.
The December 2018 decision in Stricklin v. Stefani151 described earlier152
provides another example of an instructions case resulting in tort liability
for a speaker who triggered others’ actions. In Stricklin, the plaintiff alleged
being “trampled and forcibly pushed into a wall”153 not by defendant Gwen
Stefani, but instead by third parties who followed Stefani’s invitation to
move closer to the stage.154 Thus, just as in Gersh v. Anglin and Weirum v.
RKO General, the plaintiff attempted to hold the defendant-speaker
tortiously liable for the acts of others who directly harmed the plaintiff.
Judge Robert Conrad, Jr. in Stricklin cited Weirum favorably in holding
Gwen Stefani liable for negligence. 155 As he described it, Stefani gave
“concert directions”156 when she “invited the audience to come forward.”157
Linking Weirum and Stricklin, the judge wrote,

147. Id.
148. Id.
149. The court called it “of no consequence that the harm to decedent was inflicted by third parties
acting negligently.” Id.
150. As a California appellate court in a later case stressed about the facts of Weirum, “[t]he
Weirum broadcasts actively and repeatedly encouraged listeners to speed to announced locations.
Liability was imposed on the broadcaster for urging listeners to act in an inherently dangerous manner.”
Olivia N. v. Nat’l Broad. Co., 178 Cal. Rptr. 888, 894 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981).
151. 358 F. Supp. 3d 516 (W.D.N.C. 2018).
152. See supra notes 59–63 and accompanying text.
153. Stricklin, 358 F. Supp. 3d at 523.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 529.
156. Id.
157. Id.
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[T]he issue is civil accountability for the foreseeable results of
Stefani’s in-person invitation to patrons to move toward the stage,
which created an undue risk of harm to Plaintiff and other patrons.
The Weirum case involved the transmission of a contemporaneous
invitation to listeners and a clear call to action. In fact, Plaintiff’s case
is even stronger on the foreseeability prong because Stefani’s
announcement was made to listeners in her immediate presence
rather than through a medium such as the radio or television.158
The last part of his analysis raises another issue about vicarious liability:
Should it make a legal difference if the third parties who allegedly followed
the defendant-speaker’s words were physically present and in immediate
proximity to the speaker when the words were uttered? If such
contemporaneous physical and temporal presence militates for imposing
vicarious liability, then this works against holding a speaker such as Andrew
Anglin liable. Physical presence between speaker and audience, as well as
temporal contemporaneousness between the utterance of speech and its
receipt, is lacking in Gersh.
Furthermore, unlike in Stricklin where acting on the speaker’s words was
almost immediately necessary if one wanted a closer seat, there was no
immediate need to act upon reading Anglin’s Internet-posted words if one
wanted to harass Tanya Gersh. Readers of Anglin’s words had time to
rationally reflect on and to consider them carefully and deliberately before
deciding whether to act on them.159 This arguably militates against holding
Anglin vicariously liable because it suggests the third-party actors had
greater control over their actions.
In addition to the above explanation, Judge Conrad also made it clear
that imposing vicarious liability on Gwen Stefani was permissible because
her speech did not further an important First Amendment value such as “the
exposition of ideas, search for truth, and the vitality of a society.”160 Instead,
he determined her words “actually disserve society by creating the potential
for disorder and danger.”161 Because Stefani’s speech did not advance “the

158. Id.
159. The belief that individuals can reflect upon speech before acting or speaking was noted
recently by the U.S. Supreme Court. See Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1735 (2017)
(“A fundamental principle of the First Amendment is that all persons have access to places where they
can speak and listen, and then, after reflection, speak and listen once more.” (emphasis added)).
160. See Stricklin, 358 F. Supp. 3d at 527. Judge Conrad reasoned that “Stefani’s statement was
intended to prompt action; it was not intended to further the marketplace of ideas or to aid in ‘the
common quest for truth and the vitality of society as a whole.’” Id. at 528 (quoting Bose Corp. v.
Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 503–04 (1984)).
161. Id. at 527.
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principles and purposes undergirding the First Amendment,”162 holding her
responsible for the acts of others did not raise a constitutional concern.
This tack tracks former Yale Law School Dean Robert Post’s position
that “First Amendment coverage is triggered by those forms of social
interaction that realize First Amendment values.”163 This, in turn, recalls
considerations of high and low value speech espoused by the Supreme Court
in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire164 and the related proposition that lowvalue categories of speech receive either no First Amendment protection or
“can be regulated on the basis of their content without having to satisfy strict
scrutiny.”165 As Post writes, “[d]ifferent kinds of speech embody different
constitutional values, and each kind of speech should receive constitutional
protections appropriate to the value it embodies.”166
Furthermore, a values-based approach for determining when something
raises true First Amendment concerns resonates in dissents in both the 2018
U.S. Supreme Court cases of National Institute of Family and Life
Advocates v. Becerra167 and Janus v. American Federation of State, County,
and Municipal Employees.168 In Becerra, Justice Stephen Breyer authored
a dissent joined by fellow liberal-leaning justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg,
Sonia Sotomayor, and Elena Kagan.169 He suggested that heightened First
Amendment review applies only in cases when certain “widely accepted
First Amendment goals” 170 are served and when “the true value of
protecting freedom of speech”171 is at stake.
In Janus, Justice Kagan penned a dissent for the same bloc of justices.172
She opined that the First Amendment was meant “to protect democratic
governance”173 and that, in turn, heightened First Amendment concerns are
162. Id. at 530.
163. Robert Post, Encryption Source Code and the First Amendment, 15 B ERKELEY T ECH . L.J.
713, 716 (2000).
164. 315 U.S. 568 (1942). In Chaplinksy, the Court declared that some categories of speech serve
“no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step to truth that any
benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality.”
Id. at 572; see also Geoffrey R. Stone, Content Regulation and the First Amendment, 25 W M . & M ARY
L. R EV . 189, 194 (1983) (noting that “[t]he ‘low’ value theory first appeared in the famous dictum of
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire”).
165. Genevieve Lakier, The Invention of Low-Value Speech, 128 H ARV . L. R EV . 2166, 2171
(2015).
166. Robert Post & Amanda Shanor, Adam Smith’s First Amendment, 128 H ARV . L. R EV . F. 165,
181–82 (2015).
167. 138 S. Ct. 2361 (2018).
168. 138 S. Ct. 2448 (2018).
169. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. at 2379 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
170. Id. at 2382.
171. Id. at 2383 (emphasis added). In Becerra, Justice Breyer suggested that such values include
protecting unpopular ideas from suppression and safeguarding the marketplace of ideas to facilitate the
search for truth. Id. at 2382.
172. Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2487 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
173. Id. at 2502.
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not raised by “workaday economic and regulatory policy.” 174 Kagan
concluded that judges should not be “weaponizing the First Amendment . . .
to intervene in economic and regulatory policy.” 175 Viewed collectively,
both the dissents in Becerra and Janus suggest that heightened First
Amendment concerns for safeguarding speech only arise when the speech
at issue serves certain values.
In a nutshell, Judge Conrad’s logic in Stricklin that imposing vicarious
liability on Gwen Stefani was permissible because her speech did “not
further the exposition of ideas, search for truth, and the vitality of a
society”176 tracks a values-based approach for potential First Amendment
protection that reverberates all the way from Chaplinsky through and
including the 2018 dissents in Becerra and Janus. As applied to vicarious
liability cases such as Gersh, Weirum, and Stricklin, a values-based
methodology suggests a court has greater power to impose such
responsibility on a speaker for the actions of third parties if the speech in
question:
1) is not about a matter of public concern—a consideration Judge
Christensen examined in Gersh,177 and
2) does not serve a core First Amendment value such as discovery of
truth in the marketplace of ideas178 or facilitating self-governance in
a democratic society.179
With this deeper analysis of possible approaches to vicarious liability in
mind, the Commentary next concludes by suggesting a framework for
courts to use in future cases when a speaker’s words urging action allegedly
174. Id. at 2501.
175. Id. In other words, Justice Kagan believes First Amendment safeguards apply with full force
when speech affecting democratic self-governance is at stake, but not when speech is regulated only
incidentally by laws that serve larger economic policy interests.
176. Stricklin v. Stefani, 358 F. Supp. 3d 516, 527 (W.D.N.C. 2018).
177. See supra notes 64–74 and accompanying text.
178. The marketplace of ideas theory is “one of the most powerful images of free speech, both for
legal thinkers and for laypersons.” MATTHEW D. BUNKER, CRITIQUING FREE SPEECH: FIRST
AMENDMENT THEORY AND THE CHALLENGE OF INTERDISCIPLINARITY 2 (2001). It is premised on the
belief that free expression “contributes to the promotion of truth.” Daniel J. Solove, The Virtues of
Knowing Less: Justifying Privacy Protections Against Disclosure, 53 DUKE L.J. 967, 998 (2003).
179. The U.S. Supreme Court observed more than a half-century ago:
Whatever differences may exist about interpretations of the First Amendment, there is
practically universal agreement that a major purpose of that Amendment was to protect the free
discussion of governmental affairs. This of course includes discussions of candidates, structures
and forms of government, the manner in which government is operated or should be operated,
and all such matters relating to political processes.
Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218–19 (1966); see also ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND
ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT 25 (1948) (suggesting that the ultimate aim of free speech “is the
voting of wise decisions,” and contending that voters “must be made as wise as possible”).
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cause the tortious conduct of others with whom the speaker lacks an agency
relationship.
CONCLUSION: TOWARD A FEDERAL RULE
When First Amendment and tort law principles collide, the U.S. Supreme
Court has, in some instances, created specific rules limiting the reach of
state tort law.180 Most notably, in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,181 the
Court adopted what it called “a federal rule” to address the appropriate fault
standard in libel cases brought by public officials regarding their official
conduct.182 The Court held in Sullivan that such plaintiffs cannot recover
unless they prove that the allegedly defamatory “statement was made with
‘actual malice’—that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless
disregard of whether it was false or not.”183 In essence, the Sullivan Court
began the “constitutionalization of tort law,”184 making it clear that “private
law rules restricting speech were subject to constitutional restrictions.”185 In
the process, the Court “radically limited the scope of defamation law in the
United States.”186
Although the federal rule of actual malice is now openly questioned by
Justice Clarence Thomas,187 the Court has also applied it as a mandated First

180. First Amendment principles are allowed to cabin and confine tort rules because “under the
Supremacy Clause, federal constitutional law trumps contrary state tort law.” Thomas B. Colby, The
Constitutionalization of Torts?, 65 D E P AUL L. R EV . 357, 357 (2016).
181. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
182. Id. at 279.
183. Id. at 279–80.
184. Paul A. LeBel, The Constitutional Interest in Getting the News: Toward a First Amendment
Protection from Tort Liability for Surreptitious Newsgathering, 4 W M . & M ARY B ILL R TS . J. 1145,
1149 (1996).
185. Neil M. Richards & Daniel J. Solove, Prosser’s Privacy Law: A Mixed Legacy, 98 C ALIF .
L. R EV . 1887, 1902 (2010).
186. Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., The Polysemy of Privacy, 88 I ND . L.J. 881, 885 (2013).
187. Justice Thomas in February 2019 called Sullivan’s adoption of the actual malice rule and
later Supreme Court decisions that extended its application to other scenarios “policy-driven decisions
masquerading as constitutional law.” McKee v. Cosby, 139 S. Ct. 675, 676 (2019) (Thomas, J.,
concurring in the denial of certiorari). Thomas’s concern, particularly as it involves stretching actual
malice’s application from the realm of public-official plaintiffs to the domain of public-figure plaintiffs,
is that “[n]one of these decisions made a sustained effort to ground their holdings in the Constitution’s
original meaning.” Id. at 677–78. As Thomas put it, “[t]here are sound reasons to question whether either
the First or Fourteenth Amendment, as originally understood, encompasses an actual-malice standard
for public figures or otherwise displaces vast swaths of state defamation law.” Id. at 680. Thomas
concluded that:
We did not begin meddling in this area until 1964, nearly 175 years after the First Amendment
was ratified. The States are perfectly capable of striking an acceptable balance between
encouraging robust public discourse and providing a meaningful remedy for reputational harm.
We should reconsider our jurisprudence in this area.
Id. at 682.
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Amendment rule in IIED tort cases188 involving satirical speech that causes
harm. Specifically, the Court ruled in Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell189
that:
[P]ublic figures and public officials may not recover for the tort of
intentional infliction of emotional distress by reason of publications
such as the one here at issue without showing in addition that the
publication contains a false statement of fact which was made with
“actual malice,” i.e., with knowledge that the statement was false or
with reckless disregard as to whether or not it was true.190
Furthermore, as described earlier, 191 the Supreme Court in Snyder v.
Phelps192 appeared to adopt another federal rule—that speech addressing
matters of public concern 193 while conveyed “on public property, in a
peaceful manner”194 is shielded from tort liability. As Chief Justice John
Roberts wrote for the majority, “Given that Westboro’s speech was at a
public place on a matter of public concern, that speech is entitled to ‘special
protection’ under the First Amendment.”195
The issue now becomes, in light of cases such as Gersh and Dumpson
involving Internet-triggered troll storms, whether the Supreme Court should
adopt a new federal rule for vicarious tort liability when a speaker urges
others to commit acts later deemed tortious but the speaker’s words do not
fall into a category of speech unprotected by the First Amendment. This
Commentary advocates supplementing the Claiborne Hardware test, which
asks whether a speaker-defendant “authorized, directed, or ratified specific
tortious activity,”196 because it was developed well before the advent of the
Internet and when Andrew Anglin became “the trollmaster of the altright.”197
Importantly, the narrow focus here—exactly as it is in the cases of Gersh,
Dumpson, Stricklin, and Weirum—is liability premised on an individual
speaker’s words urging others to take action. These types of cases stand in
contrast to a distinct line of copycat and how-to disputes—ones not at issue
188. See supra note 1 and accompanying text (addressing the elements of IIED).
189. 485 U.S. 46 (1988).
190. Id. at 56.
191. See supra notes 65–67 and accompanying text.
192. 562 U.S. 443 (2011).
193. See id. at 451 (“Whether the First Amendment prohibits holding Westboro liable for its
speech in this case turns largely on whether that speech is of public or private concern, as determined by
all the circumstances of the case.”).
194. Id. at 460.
195. Id. at 458.
196. NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 927 (1982).
197. O’Brien, supra note 25.
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in this Commentary—involving tort liability for the producers and
publishers of speech products such as movies, 198 video games, 199
instructional books, 200 educational articles, 201 and musical albums 202 for
allegedly causing violence and death.203
What, then, should courts do when it comes to vicarious liability in
scenarios where a speaker urges others with whom he or she lacks an agency
relationship to engage in conduct later deemed tortious? The approach
offered below is merely one potential method for addressing this question.
It builds from cases and principles addressed earlier in this Commentary.
This proffered tack, in turn, is simply a starting point for prospective
consideration by scholars and jurists at a time when troll-storm cases such
as Gersh v. Anglin and Dumpson v. Ade percolate through the court system.
At bottom, every case involving potential vicarious liability for speech
urging action must involve a fact-intensive inquiry into precisely what was
said and the circumstances under which it was said. The “what was said”
facet, this Commentary concludes, is pivotal for initially determining if the
First Amendment should provide any form of protection from vicarious
liability for a person’s speech that supposedly causes others to commit torts.
In particular, adopting a First Amendment rule limiting vicarious
liability seems most important when the speech relates to a matter of public
198. See, e.g., Byers v. Edmondson, 826 So. 2d 551 (La. Ct. App. 2002) (rejecting tort liability
against the director and producers of the film Natural Born Killers stemming from the actions of
individuals who watched that film and supposedly were inspired by it to shoot the plaintiff); Olivia N.
v. Nat’l Broad. Co., 178 Cal. Rptr. 888, 891 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981) (rejecting tort liability in a case in
which the plaintiff, a nine-year-old girl, “was attacked and forcibly ‘artificially raped’ with a bottle by
minors at a San Francisco beach” who had watched the movie Born Innocent on an NBC-affiliated
television station and allegedly imitated something they saw in it).
199. See, e.g., James v. Meow Media, Inc., 300 F.3d 683 (6th Cir. 2002) (rejecting the imposition
of tort liability on the producers of several violent video games that allegedly caused fourteen-year-old
Michael Carneal to shoot, wound, and kill several individuals at Heath High School in Paducah,
Kentucky).
200. See, e.g., Rice v. Paladin Enters., 128 F.3d 233 (4th Cir. 1997) (holding that the First
Amendment did not bar imposing civil liability on the publisher of a book called Hit Man: A Technical
Manual for Independent Contractors after a reader of it murdered three people).
201. See, e.g., Herceg v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 814 F.2d 1017, 1018 (5th Cir. 1987) (rejecting
tort liability against the publisher of a magazine based on the death of a fourteen-year-old boy who read
an article entitled “Orgasm of Death” that described the practice of autoerotic asphyxia and then died
while attempting to perform that act despite the article’s statement that the facts it presented were “solely
for an educational purpose”).
202. See, e.g., McCollum v. CBS, Inc., 249 Cal. Rptr. 187 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988) (rejecting tort
liability in a case involving a nineteen-year-old man who committed suicide while listening to a musical
album recorded by singer John “Ozzy” Osbourne).
203. Courts in this line of copycat and how-to cases typically adopt the Brandenburg incitement
test when considering tort liability. See Juliet Dee, Basketball Diaries, Natural Born Killers and School
Shootings: Should There Be Limits on Speech Which Triggers Copycat Violence?, 77 D ENV . U. L. R EV .
713, 715 (2000) (noting that in most of these scenarios, “courts have refused to consider whether the
media were ‘negligent,’ ruling instead that unless the media were guilty of ‘incitement’ as defined by
First Amendment law, the media could not be held liable for the harm or injury despite the fact that the
harm mimics the medium’s content”).
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concern. The Supreme Court was particularly concerned with shielding such
expression from tort liability in Snyder, 204 Sullivan, 205 and Falwell. 206
Additionally, and as suggested by Judge Conrad’s analysis in Stricklin,207 if
the speech serves a value that the First Amendment privileges, such as truth
discovery or advancing democratic self-governance, then a federal rule
providing at least some protection from vicarious liability for the acts of
others seems justified. Thus, as a threshold matter under this proposed
approach, First Amendment safeguards from vicarious liability come into
play only when a defendant’s speech urging action: 1) directly relates208 to
a matter of public concern, or 2) significantly serves209 an important First
Amendment value.210 This constitutes step one.
The next consideration in such cases where this threshold standard is
satisfied is whether the First Amendment should afford defendant-speakers
absolute protection from vicarious liability for torts committed by others.
The danger with such an absolute-protection approach, however, is that a
speaker may purposefully blend into his overall message words that directly
relate to a matter of public concern or that significantly serve a First
Amendment value as a mere pretext or ploy for triggering constitutional
204. See supra notes 65–67, 192–195 and accompanying text (discussing Snyder v. Phelps).
205. See supra notes 181–186 (discussing New York Times Co. v. Sullivan). The Court in Sullivan
noted “a profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be
uninhibited, robust, and wide-open.” New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
206. See supra notes 189–190 (discussing Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell). In Falwell, the
Court emphasized that “[a]t the heart of the First Amendment is the recognition of the fundamental
importance of the free flow of ideas and opinions on matters of public interest and concern.” Hustler
Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 50 (1988).
207. See supra notes 160–162.
208. The phrase “directly relates” is strategically chosen because it prevents speech that is merely
tangentially or peripherally related to a matter of public concern from receiving First Amendment
protection in the face of tort liability. In other words, in attempting to strike a balance between tort
interests in compensating individuals for harm and First Amendment interests of protecting speech, this
is designed to mitigate the danger of a speaker receiving First Amendment protection simply by loosely
relating his or her speech urging action to a larger issue of public concern.
209. The phrase “significantly serves” is strategically chosen because it prevents speech that
barely or minimally serves a traditional First Amendment value from receiving First Amendment
protection in the face of tort liability. An analogy in current First Amendment jurisprudence to such a
requirement is the third prong of the Supreme Court’s test for obscenity under Miller v. California, 413
U.S. 15, 24 (1973). The third prong protects speech if it has “serious literary, artistic, political, or
scientific value.” Id. (emphasis added).
210. In cases involving speech that does not directly relate to a matter of public concern and that
does not significantly serve a traditional First Amendment value, the general rules of the underlying tort
would simply apply. For example, in the IIED cause of action against Andrew Anglin in Gersh v. Anglin,
a court would simply apply the traditional elements of the IIED tort to Anglin’s behavior. In most states,
under the traditional four elements of the IIED tort described earlier in note 1, this would entail asking
whether: 1) urging a troll storm of the kind called for by Anglin was extreme and outrageous behavior;
2) Anglin urged the troll storm with either the intention of causing Gersh to suffer emotional distress or
with reckless disregard of doing so; 3) Tanya Gersh suffered emotional distress as a result of the troll
storm that ensued; and 4) the distress that Gersh suffered was severe.
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protection. A message may be a wily hybrid of speech affecting a matter of
public concern and urging others to act against a specific individual. These
mixed-message scenarios demand closer scrutiny rather than a blanket rule
precluding vicarious liability. Therefore, rather than ending the vicarious
liability analysis after the first step and giving absolute protection to speech
that directly relates to a matter of public concern or that significantly serves
an important First Amendment value, a second step is essential.
That second proposed step, this Commentary argues, is for a court to
decide if there is clear and convincing evidence either that the speakerdefendant, per the Supreme Court’s extant approach in Claiborne
Hardware, “authorized, directed, or ratified specific tortious activity”211 or,
per the discussion in Part II regarding instructions, 212 repeatedly urged
within a short period of time others to take specific and immediate action
toward an identifiable individual while also providing detailed instructions
facilitating how to do so. If either part of this disjunctive second step is
found by a court to exist, then the First Amendment will not prevent the
imposition of vicarious tort liability. If, however, neither part is held to exist,
then the First Amendment shields a speaker who urges others to tortious
action from vicarious liability for the others’ misdeeds.
In unpacking this second step, the requirement that there must be clear
and convincing evidence—something greater than a mere preponderance of
the evidence213—to satisfy this part of the test comports with the federal rule
of actual malice adopted in Sullivan. In Sullivan, the Court held that actual
malice must be proved by “convincing clarity.” 214 Clear and convincing
evidence is synonymous today with convincing clarity.215
Ramping up the evidentiary requirement here is also designed to balance
out the requirement in the threshold step that the defendant-speaker’s words
must not merely relate to a matter of public concern or serve a traditional

211. NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 927 (1982).
212. See supra notes 132–158 and accompanying text.
213. See Callahan v. Westinghouse Broad. Co., 363 N.E.2d 240, 242 (Mass. 1977) (noting that
“[c]lear and convincing proof involves a degree of belief greater than the usually imposed burden of
proof by a fair preponderance of the evidence, but less than the burden of proof beyond a reasonable
doubt imposed in criminal cases”); Weber v. Anderson, 269 N.W.2d 892, 895 (Minn. 1978) (opining
that the clear and convincing standard “means exactly what is suggested by the ordinary meanings of
the terms making up the phrase. Satisfaction of this standard requires more than a preponderance of the
evidence but less than proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Clear and convincing proof will be shown where
the truth of the facts asserted is ‘highly probable’”).
214. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 285–86 (1964).
215. See Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 30 (1971) (asserting that “New York
Times held that in a civil libel action by a public official against a newspaper those guarantees required
clear and convincing proof that a defamatory falsehood alleged as libel was” published with actual
malice (emphasis added)); Phila. Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 773 (1986) (noting that the
“clear and convincing” standard is a reformulation of “convincing clarity”).
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First Amendment value, but that they must do so directly 216 and
significantly. 217 In other words, the heightened clear-and-convincing
evidence standard on the second part of the proposed framework for
vicarious liability tilts in favor of protecting First Amendment speech
interests. In contrast, the heightened “directly relates”218 and “significantly
serves”219 requirements on the threshold step lean in favor of serving the tort
law interest in compensating plaintiffs for harm.
The first prong of this disjunctive test was already established in
Claiborne Hardware and thus requires no elaboration here. The second
prong, however, is new and consequently needs fleshing out. In particular,
the second prong, although not developed exclusively to address troll storm
scenarios, was created with such situations in mind. It has several elements.
They are explained below in an initial effort to give meaning to the terms
used in the phrase “repeatedly urged within a short period of time others to
take specific and immediate action toward an identifiable individual while
also providing detailed instructions facilitating how to do so.”
First, this prong only applies to repeated urgings. This requires, at
minimum, the communication of at least two messages by the speakerdefendant. This is designed to be free-speech friendly because it shields
from vicarious tort liability a defendant who communicates only one
message. The urgings, in turn, must be more than mere suggestions of
possible action or equivocal musings about the potential for action. They
must, instead, clearly encourage and advocate that readers engage in the
conduct.
Second, this prong requires that the communication of those messages
occur within a short period of time. Rather than specify a precise cut-off
period, such as within forty-eight hours, this is purposefully left flexible to
provide a judge with discretion to consider the totality of the circumstances.
Third, this prong mandates that the messages call for others to take
specific and immediate action. This means both that the action called for
must be described specifically and with particularity, and that the speaker
urges it to take place immediately. The term “immediately” allows a judge
some flexibility here compared to “instantaneously,” but clearly the
inclusion in a message of phrases such as “act now” or “don’t wait” militate
in favor of finding the message urged immediate action.
Fourth, the message must urge action against an identifiable individual.
In other words, had Andrew Anglin’s message said something akin to
216.
217.
218.
219.

See supra note 208 and accompanying text.
See supra note 209 and accompanying text.
See supra note 208.
See supra note 209.
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“harass Jews,” it would not satisfy this requirement. Either directly naming
a specific person or describing a specific person (but without naming her)
in such precise detail that a reasonable reader of the messages would know
who she is, however, would satisfy it.
Fifth and finally, the second prong requires that the messages provide
detailed instructions for facilitating the urged-for conduct. As in Gersh,
providing addresses—social media or otherwise—and phone numbers for
contacting the identifiable individual, along with suggestions or templates
for what should be said to that individual, are relevant factors here in troll
scenarios. Judges have discretion here to decide whether or not sufficient
action-facilitating information has been provided to satisfy this criterion.
There is not, in other words, a pre-defined quantity of what constitutes
sufficient information.
In summary, the proposed framework addresses the question of vicarious
liability for speakers who urge actions by others that are allegedly tortious.
It is merely an initial effort to provide one such possibility that attempts to
balance tort law and the First Amendment freedom of speech, as cases akin
to Gersh v. Anglin and Dumpson v. Ade are sure to arise in the near future.
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